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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REBECCA SIMS LORD, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID GEORGE LORD, 
Defendant/Appel ant. 
Case No. 19167 
BRIEF OF APPELANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a divorce action instituted by Respondent, 
Rebecca Sims Lord, in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
Court, in and for Washington County, State of Utah, on June 22, 1981. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On May 28, 1982, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, presiding as Judge 
of the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington County, after 
trial entered Judgment of divorce in this action, reserving Judgment per-
taining to distribution of property for a later trial. On January 31, 1983, 
the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, entered a Supplemental Decree and Judgment 
pertaining to Distribution of Property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant David George Lord seeks to have this Court reverse certain 
findings and the Judgment of the lower Court, and specifically to find and 
J~clare that: 
1. The lower Court erred in ruling the Quit Claim deed dated 
October 23, 1977 and filed in 1979 pertaining to the marital house executed 
Gy the Plaintiff is a nullity and was wrongfully recorded and shall have no 
eftect at law or i11 ey"1ty and Plarntift/Rec,µondenL h enl1LIC'r! to an f'<iuit-
able lien in the amount of $23,500 against the marital hon1e. 
2. The lower Court erred in granting Plaintiff/kespondent the 
sum of $5,023.75 to ei.juitably reimburse her for her 111onetary contribution tn 
the business. 
3. The lower Court erred in not granting Defendant/Appellant's 
Motion for Change of Venue after bifurcating the divorce action into a trial 
for divorce and a trial for property settlement. 
4. The lower Court erred in granting Plaintiff/Respondent attorn-
eys fees in the sum of $9,000. 
5. The lower Court erred in not granting Defendant/Appellant's 
Motion for Trial Continuance and holding the trial in his absence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
~a...,,,._ 
Defendant married the Plaintiff on the 11th day of Fehraa:c¥ 1973 in 
6 
Elko, Elko County, Nevada. The marriage survived twelve (Fir) years and there 
were no children born as issue of the marriage. Up until May of 1974 Defend-
ant worked fulltime as a police officer for Salt Lake City, Utah and managed 
his part time sole proprietorship business of Accident Investigation and Cause 
Analysis he established in the mi~e sixties. In May of 1974 Defendant re-
signed as an employee of the State of Utah and withdrew from the State Reti~-
ment Fund those monies that were due and owing to him for retirement purpose1 
and expanded his Accident Investigation and Cause Analysis business to a full· 
time business. Defendant then hired the Plaintiff to keep books, to perform 
secretarial services, to do billings and etc. Plaintiff had free access to 
the company checking account and paid herself for the work she was supposed 
do. Although she paid herself with amounts of money from the company, shC' 
fused to help conduct the business of the company and Defendant had to h1n' '"' 
side secretarial help to perform the tasks that had been assigned to the Plair 
-2-
--
tiff. The busines> ran into financial difficulties and the Plaintiff gave 
Defendant a gift of $6,000 to help the business over rough times. After 
twenty-two (22) months the marriage became rocky and replete with turmoil, 
resulting in eleven separations by the Plaintiff from the Defendant begin-
ning in October of 1974 culminating in the eleventh and final separation in 
October of 1979. During all of the separations the Plaintiff returned to 
her hometown of St. George, Utah and lived with her mother with the exception 
of the final separation wherein in May of 1981 Plaintiff after a prolonged 
love affair while still being married moved in with a St. George police off-
icer, Dennis Rogers. 
In October of 1977, Defendant realized that eventually the marriage 
would end in divorce regardless of his efforts to keep the marriage together. 
Defendant knew that if the marriage did culminate in divorce that Plaintiff 
would return to her hometown of St. George, Utah leaving their marital home 
which is located at 8950 Alpen Way, Sandy, Utah. It was Defendant's desire 
to retain the marital home and therefore proposed to Plaintiff that he would 
buy her half interest in the home if she would sell it to him. Plaintiff a-
greed and a bargain was struck that in return for her one-half interest in the 
marital home the Defendant would purchase a brand new 1977 Toyota Celica auto-
mobile valued at $9,000 in return for that half interest. The $9,000 exceeded 
Plaintiff's one-half equity interest in the marital home. Defendant purchased 
the 1977 automobile and paid all monies out of his own pocket and gave Plain-
tiff a title free and clear to the automobile (page 141, 142, Volume I). In 
return the Plaintiff executed a Quit Claim deed to Defendant conveying her in-
terest in the marital home which was properly executed and duly recorded with 
the Salt Lake County Recorder's office (page 14, Volume I). 
On the day of the final separation the Defendant told Plaintiff she 
could have any or all of the marital property of the parties. The Plaintiff 
-3-
kitchen including, but not limited to silverware; d shes; pots, pJns; fo,,1 
processor; blender; electric fry pan; microwave oven; three volumes of cook-
books; all utensil:,; the racksout of the kitchen drawc1s; clock radio; l 1vir 1. 
room couch; a check from the Defendant for $1,000; took with her without De-
fendant's knowledge a Chevron creditcard, a Conoco creditcard; personal pict-
ur~s of Defendant and moved them to St. George 1~~~ 
Plaintiff unknown to Defendant moved in with Dennis Rogers after a 
lengttiycourtsr.ip, in May l'lP.l and filed for divorce on June 22, 1981 v1herein 
she asked that the marital home be sold and the proceeds be split equally be-
tween them; lhat stie be given the Toyota that was already in her name; wanted 
additional marital property from the house; one-half of the business; wanted 
the $6,000 back; attorney> fees; temporary alimony in the amount of $300 per 
month and a Restraining Order to keep Defendant away from her whom she hadn't 
seen in nine months. Plaintiff filed for divorce in the District Court of 
Wahsington County in St. George, Utah which is approximately 300 miles south 
of Salt Lake City (page 1, Volume I). 
Defendant answered Plaintiff's Complaint and Counterclaimed against the 
Plaintiff for divorce on the grounds of adultery and desertion as well as con-
travened her· allegations (page 7, Volume I). 
Plaintiff moved for a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cai 
to be held on Wednesday, the 9th day of September, 1981 at the hour of 10:00 
A.M. in the Washington County Courthouse (page G, Volume I). Defendant proper 
filed a Motion for Continuance on the yrounds that the Defendant had been Sub· 
poenaed to appear in another matter in Los Angeles, California and that Drfew 
ant had submitted Interrogatories (page 20, Volume I) and Re 1uests for l\d11.1, 
sions (page 16, Volume I) which he needed the ''"swe1·s thereto rn order to I" 
fer to the Court matters of proof in beh~lf of the Defendant to defend at th• 
Order to Show Cause Heariny. Defenu011t's counsel t<Jlkr>d tn, by telephone, 
-1-
f'i<l 111L1ft ':,counsel allout the Continuance in which Plaintiff's counsel a-
greed to the Continuance which was memorialized by letter (page 75, Volume I). 
On the date of the Hearing Plaintiff~ counsel appeared in Court where Judge 
Robert F. Owens of the Circuit Court .wag sitting as Judge Pro-Tempore heard 
Plaintiff's counsel's objection to the Continuance and the Court's Order was 
that Defendant having failed to appear and make arrangements for counsel to 
appear for this Hearing, went ahead and granted the Temporary Restraining Ord-
er and granted Plaintiff $300 per month as Temporary Support pending Hearing 
on its merits (Minute Order between page 43 and 44, Volume I). Defendant's 
counsel's Motion for a Continuance. {page 51 and 52, Volume I). 
Plaintiff's counsel made the following Motions and Notice of Hearings: 
1. Request for Entry on Land {page 68, Volume !). 
2. Notice of Taking Deposition of Defendant (Between page 69 and 
70, Volume I). 
3. Motion for Entry on Land and Notice of Hearing for October 14, 
1981 (page 110, Volume I). 
4. Motion to Amend Complaint and Notice of Hearing for October 14, 
1981 (page 112, Volume I). 
5. Notice of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Protective Order A-
gainst Taking Defendant's Deposition in St. George on October 14, 1981 (page 
100, Volume I). 
Defendant's counsel made the following Motions, Objections and Notice 
of Hearings: 
1. Objection to Court's Order granting Plaintiff's Temporary Re-
straining Order and Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing for October 14, 
1981 (page 70, 73, Volume I). 
2. Notice of Objection to Plaintiff's Interrogatories and Request 
for Production of Documents (page 78, Volume !). Motion for Protective Order 
on Limitation of Discovery (page 79, Volume I) and Notice of Hearing for Oct-
ober 13, i'JLl \µage: j3, Vo1ur11e 11 . 
3. Objection to Request For Entry on Land (page 89, Volume 1). 
4. Objection to Taking Defendant's fl1 1JOsition in St. Georg•· 
and Motion for Protective Order (page 86, Vol u111e 1). 
5. Motion to Compell Discovery and l:otic1· of Hearing for 
October 14, 1981 (page 114, 116, Volume I). 
On the 13th day of October, 1981, Defendant and counsel were in 
St. George for the aforementioned hearings. While walking toward the Court-
house in St. George the Defendant was stopped by the Plaintiff who stated 
that it had never been her desire to pursue the divorce this far and just 
wanted to get out of the marriage. Defendant told Plaintiff to go back and 
tell her counsel this. Which she did and the aforementioned hearing; sched-
uled for October 13 and 14, 1981 were Continued without date by Stipulation 
of the Parties (Minute Order on Continuation without date between page 122 
and 123, Volume 1). 
Plaintiff's counsel Noticed up a Hearing for February 9, 1982 for a 
Motion to Compel Entry on Land (page 12S, Volume I). Defendant Counter-
rootioned (page 127, Volume I). The Honorable J. Harlan Burns granted Plain-
tiff's Motion (page 132, Volume I). Defendant then objected to the Court's 
Order (page 134, Volume I). Defendant then timely ap~.aled the Court Order 
to the Utah Supreme Court. (page 174, Volume I). The appeal was filed wrn 
the Supreme Court (page 180, Volume I). 
Subsequent to the appeal and prior to the Supreme Court remanding the 
appeal to the District Court for further proceedings on June 6, 1982 (page 
268, Vo 1 ume I) ) Plaintiff Motions the Court fo1· rnctions for an Order r1·-
fusing to allow Defendant to oµpose Plaintiff's claims pertaining to thP 
ownership and value of the house at 8950 Alpen Way, S,1ndy, Utah. (page J4I, 
Volume I). Plaintiff Notic~d up the Hearioq for March 8, 1982. 
-6-
lhe l1onurdlJle Maur·1cc U. Jones sitting as Judge Pro-Tempore granted 
Plaintiff's Motion (Minute Order between page 157 and 158, Volume I). Plain-
tiff's cuunsel then prepared the Order which states that Plaintiff has a 
vested one-half equity interest in the house and that the Quit Claim deed 
wcts recorded without Plaintiff's consent which appears to be contrary to 
Court Order (page 159, Volume I). 
On the 29th day of April, 1982, Defendant made a Motion for Cursory 
Hearing to fully determine Plaintiff's entitlement to a divorce from the 
Defendant with the Court reserving all questions as to support, property 
division and other matters prayed for in Plaintiff's Complaint to be heard 
later (page 181, Volume I). 
The Court granted the Motion to Bifurcate (Minute Order between pages 
186 and 187, Volume I), and the divorce trial came on before the Honorable 
J. Harlan Burns on May 28, 1982. 
Plaintiff came to Court five (5) months pregnant wherein the Court 
granted the Defendant a Divorce from the Plaintiff on the grounds of adult-
ery and the Court granted the Plaintiff a Divorce from the Defendant on the 
grounds of Mental Cruelty (Minute Order between pages 266 and 267, Volume I). 
Subsequent to the divorce trial Defendant Motioned the Court for a 
Change of Venue on the property matters. The real property of the parties 
is located in Salt Lake County and there was a Quit Claim deed in dispute 
(page 87, Volume II). The Court denied Defendant's Motion for Change of 
Venue on October 21, 1982 (page 123, Volume II). 
Defendant filed a Protective Notice of Appeal (between pages 122 and 
123, Volume II). 
Defendant could not appeal the Denial of Change of Venue until Jan-
uary lS, 1983 (page 139 ,1nr1 140, Volume II) because the Court failed to make 
a Minute Order in its records on October 21, 1982 and did not make any Minute 
Urder in its r·ecords until January 11, 1983 (Minute Order between pages 139 
- ;_ 
Minute Entry i.Je made or Defenddnt be granted another Hearing 111 the Motion 
for Change of Venue. The l.ourt signed Detendctnt's (J, Jer ,lcnying ChJnuc of 
Venue on Januai-y II, 1983 (page 125, Volurnc il). 
On the afternoon of January u:. l~iU, Anthony Thurber, 1 ttorn0y at 
Law and witness for the Plaintiff called Defendant's ld1·1yer's office und 
stated that he heard an aµreal had been made and wanted to know it 1t was 
true. On affirmation he stated that it should stop the trial scheduled for 
the next day and therefore he would not appear in St. George. 
There had been correspondence between counsel on Mr. Thurber testi-
fying against Defendant. (Letters found between pages 130 and 131, Volume II). 
To protect Defendant's interest his counsel sent a Motion for Contin-
uance on January 18, 1983 by Greyhound Bus to be delivered by taxi to the 
Court on the day of scheduled trial. (Motion not in records sent to the Su-
preme Court). 
The trial was held on January 19, 1983; Anthony Thurber appeared and 
tPstified; and Defendant's Motion for Continuance was denied. 
Defendant appealed. 
ARGUMENT 
!. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRtD IN RULING THE QUIT CLAIM DEED DATED OCTOBER 23, 
1977 AND FILED IN 1979 PERTAii:1NG TO THE MARITAL HOUSE EXECUTED BY THE PLAIN-
TIFF IS P NULLITY AND WAS WRONGFULLY RECORDED AND SHALL HAVE NO EFFECT AT LAW 
OR IN EQUITY AND PLAINTIFF/APPELLA~T IS ENTITLED TO AN EQUITABLE LIEN JN THE 
AMOUNT OF $23, 500 AGAINST THE MARITAL HOME. 
Pursuant to Section 30-2-3 U.C.~. (19SJ as am0nd~rl) Conveyances hP-
tween husband and wife, "A conveyance, transfer or lien exccut~d by eitilf' 1 
husband or wife to or in favor of the other shall be valid to the same ex-
tent as between nther persons." "Convc'ydnces by ')11e srou',e to tne other of 
Jrr rntc1 c',l 11ciu Ly trre ent1rict1es ltdVe uc,ually been uµt1eld, the statutes 
generally authorizing conveyances between husband and wife being construed 
to include such interests." The necessary assent or joinder of the other 
spouse has been held to be supplied by the act of accepting the conveyance. 
H ALR 2d 634 Section 1. Consent and approval of the wife to the conveyance 
in the case at bar was indicated by the fact that she signed the deed, the 
deed was acknowledged and the husband subsequently took charge of the prop-
erty and later recorded th~ deed, she thereby consenting to the termination 
of the entirety. The payment of consideration i.e. Toyota Celica, delivery, 
and recording of the deed is said to constitute such joint action and mutual 
assent as were required to destroy the estate. The Court adding that to re-
quire the formal joinder of the wife (husband in this case) in conveying to 
herself would be "wholely unnecessary" 8 ALR Zd 638. A deed by a wife to her 
husband of her interest in land held by them by entirety was held in ELSON v. 
ELSON 245 Mich 205, 'IW 176 (1928) to be affective to convey to him all 
her interest in the land, the Court saying that although the concurrence of 
both spouses was required to sell, encumber or defeat in any way an estate 
by the entireties where one spouse deeded directly to the other, both did act, 
one by giving, and the other be accepting the deed. The Court said that the 
situation was analagous to the release by a wife of her inchoate right of dow-
er by a deed directly to her husband which had~ uniformly been held as 
valid 8 ALR 2d 638. 
In JONES v. LEWIS 243 Ne 259 90 SE 2d 547 (Ne 1955) "A conveyance 
from one spouse to the other of an interest in an estate held by the entire-
ty is valid as an estoppel when the requirements of law are complied with in 
the execution thereof." In the case at bar the Defendant has complied with 
ctatutory requirements as to validation of instruments purporting to convey 
prnperty of a married woman to wit: the Quit Claim deed, Plaintiff not be-
ing lacking in capacity to execute such an instrument, therefore such instru-
-9-
111enL i:, tree fro111 detective execution. in Uw cd~1· ,11 har thP datr", uf llir> 
purchase installii1ent agreen'1'11t to wit. October 7, !Y/7, <111J th<> ldtc 11f 
Quit Cldirn deed, October 23, 1977, should not be consir1"rr·d by this Cou1 t rl' 
being merely coincidental in li9ht of tlit• 1·11c>v 1«·ldt11H1·.h111 of the part 11 
concerned. In many Jurisdiction•, the "m111a11 ptJrportinq to convey traw,fe1 of 
property may disavow or dis:,afirin the convPyance, however her right to do 51 , 
is subject, in some jurisdictions, to certain conditions as the "_cP_sto_i-:.aJ_1_on 
of the consideration received." 41 AmJur 2d Sect ion 72, page 154. In the ca;. 
at bar the restoration of consideration has not been received. No evidence 
was p1·esented at thr "_-L1l Court which would proffer the Toyota Celica as 
being a gift to the Plaintiff. 
The law presumes that a wife in conveying property to her husband in-
tends her act shall have the affect that it purports to have on its race and 
that she parts with all interest in the property conveyed. The trial Court 
erred in not honoring Plaintiff's and the Defendant's desire to work out thc1 1 
own settlement as to an equitable distribution of property in anticipation nf 
separation and or divorce. Further the trial judge should have made a deter•· 
ination as to the property settlement or conveyance with respect to the ddte 
of the conveyance, ctnd number of separations to that date. The trial Court's 
decision encourages litigation by disavowing the rights of spouses to make 
their own settlement, only to have a Court make some other rleterminat1un at 
a later date, regardless of nuptual agreements that have been earlier agreeo 
upon. This further encourages litigation by rli'.coura~ing attempts t.o reconr ,, 
differences and pursue agreements betwlen sµuu .. r·s; this bPinq clec1rly aqa1n·,' 
public policy. 
Pursuant to LANiJ_ll_._JJ~'1_D 60'J i?rl (lit l~HIJ) "[ql11t1 1·. nllt ,,v.llL1~l 1 
reinstate rights and privileqcc, volunt 1·11; cuntrdcteil dWdJ '·""l'lv «1«11u 
one has cori1e to regret the barqa rn niJde. "vilH·rr· poc,s1hlf', till' tJnrlerlyin<J 1 
tent of a contract is to be ~le,rnPd ti·o111 th0 i,rnr:11,,.,,. «t :Ill• ins1°·u111ent it"e'' 
_',( -
111 Lhe Luot· dl bur Lh(' 1.uu1t :.,l1uu1cJ uµhulu the validity of the Quit Claim 
deed as yielding to the demands of modern life. 
In )'ICICJDW\I\[) v. WOODWARD 656 P2d 431 (Ut 1982) the Supreme Court 
otates "whether resources subject to distribution in divorce proceedings does 
not turn on whether a spouse can presently use or control or whether re-
source can be given µ1L.ent dollar value: essential criterion is whether a 
right to the benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in part during the 
n~rr1age and to the extent that right has so accrued it is subject to equit-
able distribution." In 1 ight of the numerous (11) separations of the liti-
gants; in 1 ight of the fact that Defendant made all payments from his sole 
and separate assets with regard to the marital home '6?£1e"/~/,;{ clearly should 
not be awarded any rights therein. 
In DEROSE v. DEROSE 19 Ut 2D 77, 79, 426 P2d 221, 222 {1967). "While 
the determination of the trial Court is given defference and not dist~bed 
lightly, changes should be made if that seems essential to the accomplishment 
of the desired objective of the decree, that is to make such an arrangement 
of the property and economic resources of the parties that they will have the 
best possible opportunity to reconstruct their lives on a happy and useful 
basis for themselves," free from the burden of manifest injustice. 
Pursuant to GRAMME v. GRAMME 587 P2d 144 (Ut 1979) "In the distribut-
ion of marital property there was no fixed rule or formula, thus trial Court's 
responsibility is to endeavor to provide a just and equitable adjustment of 
parties economic resources so that parties might reconstruct their lives on 
a happy and useful basis."J 5 · ;-_ ~'('tf l'(;- 7 (/fsd~~) 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah should consider the award of 
urw-hd l f interest in the home located at 8950 Al pen Way, Sandy, Utah a man-
1t~st lrlJ1J',ti,c in that the trial Court did not consider all relevent factors 
i11 thr· md'-111~ ut such distribution including the financial and personal sit-
rJt iun of t11e rldi11tiff, i.e. thr;\iumber of separations, being pregnant by a-
- 1 1 -
nolncr 111dn uuri11g l1L. ,,..,1 1 1uy~ LD u~1 L'll<JJ.11t etc. 
Should the Supreme Court of the ',tate of Ulah in itc, Pq1ii ty cn"osr· tn 
set aside the Quit Clllm deed and proceed with a division of 111uital assec•,, 
Defendant would cite CLAU_~_L_AIJ\[:J, \1ipr<''"" lour-t ut th" ·,t,1'" of lltoh 
Case No. 17864 filed December 5, l~tLl. 1\llhou1h the factual sltudtion in 
l_LAUSEr.j~LJSEN is somewhat different than in the case at bar the time 
since the filing of this action has been roughly the same. Throughout this 
extended l itig"' ion pursurng her life and since the decree of divorce her mar-
riage in St. George. Throughout this ongoing litigation Plaintiff has con-
tributed nothing to the marital estate while the Defendant ha:; made the n:onth: 
payments etc. on the home in Salt Lake County thereby increasing his equity. 
Any award of any interest in the marital home would al low her to rrof1 t f1om 
an investment which the Defendant made with his "separate" funds. It would 
now be unfair "to declare she had an interest in the present value in the hou·,r 
and perhaps force him to sell the residence to pay her an interest of the 
equity." 
Both parties agree that while the property settlement is not bindinq 
upon the trial Court in a divorce action such agreement should be respected 
and given considerable weight in the Court's determination of an equitable 
division citing JACKSON v. JACKSON, Ut 617 P2d 338 (Ut 1980); ~-~__l<_lC_!_!', 
44 P!d 472 (Ut 1975); MADSEN v. MADSEN 2 lit. 2d 423,276 P2d 917 (1954). lne 
Court in its consideration of this case should not a1-1ard any interest in the 
marital home to the Plaintiff due to (1) the cxistance of the acknov1ledr;ed 
Quit Claim deed, (2) the increase in equity in the marital hrn11e was soley J11e 
to the Defendant's outlay of nis own assets, (3) in the inc,rant rJse il <llll-
tract existed between Plaintiff Jnd Defendant. Tlwre wa·. obv111" .ly an nff 1 ' 
of an automobile for one-half of the equ1t1 in tl>r 111drital hr11111', dt thdt 1· 
(Offer) (the automobile being wor-th 111un' t 11an thP h.ilf llll"•tc',t of tlw r~u:L. 
in the home at that time). The offf'r vlrl'> .11«'\lt"d cnrl the cnnc,1der·dt1on (a·JI -
111ou1 le) µct',"L·d Iron: Uetenuant/Aµµel lctnt to Plaintiff/Respondent. The re-
turn of the considercttion not having been returned to Defendant. See 41 AmJur 
Zd. Section 142 "Avoidance or Disaffirmance." Page 154. 
I I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT THE SUM OF 
$5,023.75 TO EQUITABLY REIMBURSE HER FOR HER MONETARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
BUSINESS. 
The lower Court erred in granting Plaintiff/Respondent the sum of 
$S,023.75 to equitable reimburse her for her monetary contribution to the 
business. In LOVE v. OLSEN 645 P2d 861 (Col. CA Div 1, 1982) the Court 
stated that "wife's financial contribution to marriage was a gift rather 
than a loan where there was no note executed, no interest agreed to or paid, 
and no other testimony that the aprties intended the contribution to be paid." 
41 AmJur 2d, Section 87 - Presumption of gift to husband. "Some auth-
orities follow the rule that a husband's receipt and use of the property or 
money of his wife with her knowledge and consent does not establish between 
them the relation of debtor and creditor, or give rise to a trust or a pre-
sumption of trust for her use. On the contrary, it gives rise to a presump-
tion of gift from her to him, to be used for the benefit of either or both 
of them at his discretion, and the wife must prove any trust or promise by 
the husband to repay her. 
I I I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT/APPELANT'S MOTION FOR 
CHANGE OF VENUE AFTER BIFURCATING THE DIVORCE ACTION INTO A TRIAL FOR DIVORCE 
ANO A TRIAL FOR PROPERTY SETTLEMENT. 
The lower Court erred in not granting Defendant/Appellant's Motion for 
, l1d11~'' uf VenuP after bifurcating the divorce action. Pursuant to Section 78-
lJ-1(2) U.C.A. (19)3 as amended) - Actions respecting real property. "Actions 
for the following causes must be tried in the county in which the subject of 
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the dction, or some part thereut, is situdted, suGJec~ to the power of the 
Court to change the place of trial as provided in this Code: (~) ror the 
partition of real property. Pursuant to Section 78-13-7 U.C.A. "All Other 
Actions - in a1·, other case the action must tie 1.1-H:d in th(' cr1unty in vihic1
1 
the cause of action arises or in the county rn which ""Y Dd€ndant resin<". 
at the commencement of the action ... " Mr. Lord at no time resided with 
his spouse in Washington County, however did reside in Salt Lake County dur-
ing the cour oe of the marriage. The "cause of action: thereby aro:.,e in '.i<llt 
La~e County leaving jurisdiction in Salt Lake County. SCHRAM-JOHNSON DRUGS, 
COX 79 U. 276, 9 P2d 399 (Ut 1932) "If cause of action arose only in county 
of Defendant's residence his privilege to have pl~ce of trial changed to that 
county cannot be defeated by a sham or frivolous pleading .. 
Pursuant to Section 78-13-9(3) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) - Grounds. 
"The Court may on Mot ion change the place of triul in the fol lowing cases: 
when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of Justice would be promoted 
by the change." 
IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT ATTORNEYS FlE~ 
IN THE SUM OF $9,000. 
Under Poiri_!____i1- The Court erreo in awarding Plaintiff/Respondent 
attorneys fees in the amount of $9,000. The decision to rnard or not tu a-
ward attorneys fees is within the allowable range of the trial Court's rlis-
cretion. ADAMS _v. ADAMs_, 593 P2d, 147, 14g (Ut 1979). In _i<_E_RR~v.____l<lR_R, 
#17441, a 1981 Utah Supreme Court case held that the Court ohould take evi-
dence as to comparative incomes and SPµarate estates of the parli0s. Thi' 
is the normal basis on wh1rh attorne:ys fees ,Jt-f' alluwed or not allowPd hv 11 ' 
trial Court. 
In the case at bar the Plarntiff LoJs harl a p1-oloriJPc1 love ;iffair witli, 
lived with and became pregnant by another 111on wl11 le •,t1l I married t" the De-
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fu1danl. fnf'tt:fure:, lhe quest1un arises "why should the Defendant be required 
to pay the attorneys fees of an adultrous Plaintiff, in a divorce action, so 
she can n~rry the man who alienated her affections and got her pregnant?" 
To require the Defendant to pay those attorneys fees in this case would result 
in an unjust enrichment for the Plaintiff. 
There is clearly an alienation of affection by a Third Party of the 
Plaintiff from the Defendant. In the case of WILSON v. OLROYD, ~ P.2d ~Ut 
1954)the Court affirmed the use of the following jury instructions: 
"So long as the married status continues between 
a husband and wife, the law presumes that there 
is a possibility of reconciliation even though 
they have been estranged or have had marital dif-
ferences." 
The Court further stated that the true meaning of the jury instruction: 
"It is therefore wrongful and unlawful for anoth-
er man to court or make love to a married woman 
or to willfully encourage her to give up her af-
fection, if any, for her ~usband. If this were 
not so any person could, with impunity make love 
to a married woman where there has been friction 
or estrangement; such is not the law. 
In this case it is not equitable for the law to require the cuckold 
Defendant to pay the attorneys fees of an adult'fous Plaintiff who wants to 
get divorced so she can marry the man who alienated her affection and made 
her pregnant. 
Under Section 30-3-5 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) denies alimony to any 
former spouse when it established that the former spouse is residing with 
a person of the opposite sex and the association or relationship between them 
is with sexual contact. Therefore it would follow that the same rationale 
and logic would hold true in this case in the awarding of attorneys fees. 
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v. 
THE LOWER COcRT Ef1RED IN ~·ur GRA~i ING U[I LND/\Wi/APP[LLANT'', 
MOTION FOR TRIAL CONI :WANCl: AND HOLD!lil. THE TRIAL IN \IS ABSENCE. 
Point V - The trial Court erreJ 111 br111qi119 the lu'.><' at i>dr to Juol•J-
ment in light of the c i<cJrn,tances of th" case. 
The matter was scr.eduled for the second trial on Jctnuary 19, 1983 
to decide matiers of prcperty prior to that date the Defendant had filed u 
Motion for Change of Venue which was denied by the above-entitleJ Court on 
October 21, 1982. Defendant and his counsel were present at that Hearin9 
which was heard in the Judge's chambers. Subsequent to that Hearing the De-
fendant filed a Protective Notice of Appeal indiccl 1 .ng that he wanted to 
appeal the decision of the denial of Change of Venue because it had a bear-
ing on the ou~come of the case. In the interim, the Defendant's counsel 
discovered that no notation had been made in the Minute Entry by the Judge, 
Denying Change of Venue. Defendant's Counsel wrote a letter to the Court 
stating that in order for the records to go up to the Supreme Court it was 
necessary that a Minute Entry be made on the Minute Order as well as an 
Order signed by the Judge denying the change of venue. That if the Judge 
was not guing to make a Minute Entry as to the denial then the Defendant 
requested that he be granted another Hearing on the Motion to Ch~nqe Venue 
so that it could be properly entered into the Court's r~cords or otherwise 
the Court should make said entry in its records. The Court, finally, on 
January 11, 1983 sig11ed the Order that DefendanL's Motion for Change of Ver.iw 
had been denied. 
The Defenda11t at that tinie then dppealed the Order of th•: Coui t ,,, .. 1 
checked with the Court on .January 18, 1983 to ddcrnli1H· if th•· dpp•·al 11,,,1 
been received and wa. ~ing processed and the luurl su indicated in thP 
affirmative. However, tl1e Court dia not pnicess Defendunt's apµeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court until January 24, 1933. Two d<lys ·,uhs•'qur_'nt to that date, 
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lh,_ courl u,,.,, ',1'JnuJ d µ1npu1 L''d UruL?r wntten by Plaintiff's attorney 
stating that the ruling denying the Motion for Change of Venue was inter-
locutory only <lnd thereby not appealable. 
OncP. a District Court has submitted a matter to the Utah SuprP.me 
i nurt on appeal, all further proceedings in the lower Court come to a 
standstill until it is either ruled upon by the Supreme Court or remanded 
to the lower Court for further action. Even if the ruling denying Change of 
Venue is interlocutory in nature, once that matter has been submitted to the 
Utah Supreme Court, the only alternative avenue which opposing counsel has 
open to him is to raise the issue at the Supreme Court for the purpose of 
having the appeal denied, and even in that instance the District Court is 
without power to proceed further until the Supreme Court rules. 
Overlaid with the fact that the key witness for the Plaintiff called 
defense counsel the night before the trial in question and stated that because 
the appeal had been made he would not make an apearance in Court the follow-
ing day also helped to mislead Defendant and his counsel that the trial 
was not going to go forward the next day. 
In GONZALES v. HARRIS, 542 P2d 842 (Colo 1975) "Attendance of the lit-
igant is necessary for a fair presentation of the case and thus, absence of 
the litigant constitutes a good reason for a Continuance." Trial Court's 
legitimate concern for prevention of delay should not prejudice the essential 
rights of ~rties by forcing them to go to trial without being able to fai4:ly 
present the case. Particulary, when actions on the part of the Court has 
preJudiced the litigant's case by not making lawful entries in its records 
as to the outcome of a particular Hearing. In light of the Court's knowledge 
,,t the appeal being processed and the fact that a late entry was made in its 
, ,,, u1d'_, as to the denial of the Motion for Change of Venue, particularly when 
tl1Jt 111Jtter, hJs an outcome on the bearing of the case, the Court should not 
have proceeded with the trial. Considering that four judges have participated 
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i1. Lh1s r1.-1 tcr, the ti lJI vG11;L lll. I 11 1''11 lJ I ,<J (J. ,j I J 
as to its understanding of the CJ',(' J1, I thrrr•turc' 1·1" hdv • " Lin1, uv~r '"ii'-
stance dicotumy as to pro~edun·. 
cumstances to the cimtrary pd1·~y to d 1it·uc«1,,Jrnq ,uLh i, l11·ar1ng rn a u1vu11_. 
case has the right to be presc>nt regardll'SS of whether he is in d PO'Jl l ,un 
to affect the outcome of the µroceeurng." Lit igdnts sl1uul d have l11e µrotE• t_ 
ion of their "day in Court." ,JOHNSON v. JOHNSON 544 P2d 6'i (Al 1975). 
CONCLUSION --------
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah should reverse or in the al-
ternative remar1d for further proceedings the trial Court's rul mg that the 
Quit Claim deed dated October 23, 1977 and filed in 1979 pertaining to the 
marital house and executed by the Plaintiff is a nullity and was wrongfully 
recorded sl1all have no affect at law or inequity anrl Plaintiff/Resµondent 
is entitled tu an equitable lien in the J111ount of $23.SOO against the mar-
ital home. 
Th" Supreme Court of the State of Utah should reverse or in the al-
ternative remand proceedings the ruling of the lower Court granting the 
Plaintiff/Respondent the sum of $5,023.75 as reimbursement for her monetary 
contribution to the business of Defendant/Appelant David George Lord. 
The Supreml' Court of the State of Utah shuuld find that the lower 
Court erred in not grcnting Defendant/Appellant's Motion for change of venue 
after bifurcating the divorce action into a tnJl for divorce and a trial for 
property settlement. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah sl1oul d reverse or re111ond to 
the lower Court for further procccdin~s the lower Court'" rul in1J in gronl 111•1 
Plaintiff/Respondent atturneys 'c'eS lrl the SUlll of $9,,,r11J. 
The Supreme Court of the ~late: of UlJh s1,"uld f111>1 thJ1 the lrid1 
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iJcHlcC drl(I hulJrnr1 trlf; tnal in his <Jii'.<cllLl'. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of January, 1984. 
cu~ 
Attorney for Appellant 
255 East 400 South, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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